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 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR  
IN THE FINANCE INDUSTRY 
 
Marko Pitesa 
 
Chapter overview 
The finance industry has been singled out as a case of rampant unethical behavior and 
corporate greed. Drawing on scientific research on unethical behavior from the 
disciplines of psychology, behavioral ethics, behavioral economics, and 
organizational behavior, I discuss three characteristics of the finance industry that 
might explain the high level of unethical behavior in this domain of work. I review 
research explaining how the disproportionate representation of power and wealth 
might affect how people working in finance approach social relationships, with 
important consequences for their propensity to behave unethically. Next, I review the 
literature suggesting that competitive and demanding work environments that 
characterise many domains of finance affect the likelihood of unethical behavior both 
directly and through their effect on employees’ level of available self-regulatory 
resources. I also argue that the finance industry is marked by a low saliency of those 
affected by unethical actions and a low sense of personal agency in unethical 
behavior, and present work showing these factors that may prompt and license 
unethical conduct. Finally, I discuss how the understanding of the characteristics of 
the finance industry that contribute to the high level of unethical behavior in this 
domain may inform decision makers in regulating and managing unethical behavior in 
finance. 
 
Unethical behavior in the finance industry 
The finance industry has been singled out as a case of rampant unethical behavior and 
corporate greed (Das, 2011; Morgenson, 2011; Partnoy, 2009; Pringle, 2012). A 
recent survey conducted in the U.S. and the U.K. among senior professionals working 
in the financial sector (including fund managers, bankers, analysts and asset 
managers) found that over a quarter of respondents observed or had firsthand 
knowledge of unethical behavior in their organization (Labaton Sucharow, 2012). 
Nearly one-fourth of respondents said employees in their industry may need to engage 
in unethical behavior to be successful. About one-third said they feel pressured by 
bonus or compensation plans to engage in unethical conduct and 16% even said 
openly they would commit criminal acts at work to attain personal benefit (e.g., 
insider trading) if they could get away with it. 
In this chapter, I draw on scientific research on unethical behavior from the 
disciplines of psychology, behavioral ethics, behavioral economics, and 
organizational behavior, to outline how factors specific to the finance industry may 
lead to such shocking levels of unethical conduct in this domain of work. By finance 
industry, I refer to the sector of economy comprising “establishments primarily 
engaged in financial transactions (transactions involving the creation, liquidation, or 
 change in ownership of financial assets) and/or in facilitating financial transactions” 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). I consider how features that characterize this 
industry, such as a disproportionate representation of power and wealth (compared to 
other domains of work), competitiveness, and low salience of interpersonal impact 
contribute to unethical behavior. In this chapter, I broadly refer to unethical behavior 
as behaviors that violate the universally-held standards of morality, such as causing 
unprovoked harm (e.g., pain or death), deceiving, and breaking promises (Bok, 1995; 
Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Küng, 1996; Walzer, 2000). Such universal moral standards 
can also be conceptualized as rules of social organization that allow people to 
organize and regulate social action in a way that minimizes, at the societal level, the 
negative impact of a person’s behavior on others (Baier, 1958; Foot, 1978; Warnock, 
1971). By identifying the conditions that promote unethical behavior in the finance 
industry, this chapter may help predict and manage such problematic conduct. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section focuses on power and 
money in the finance industry. The finance industry is characterized by exceptional 
levels of power (social influence) and wealth. I present research showing these factors 
may have direct consequences for people’s propensity to engage in unethical behavior 
and may thus constitute one of the explanations for the extreme levels of unethical 
behavior in the finance industry. The subsequent section focuses on competitiveness, 
another hallmark of work in the finance industry. Research suggests that competitive 
task structure can affect the tendency to engage in unethical behavior. More generally, 
cognitive demands and time pressure introduced by highly competitive work can also 
affect unethical behavior by influencing the availability of self-regulatory resources. 
Third section considers how the salience of interpersonal impact, or the appreciation 
that the given action one is engaging in is harming others (and is thus unethical), may 
explain the high levels of unethical behavior in the finance industry. I review 
evidence suggesting that unethical behavior in the finance industry may be more 
widespread because the victims of unethical behavior are not salient and because the 
sense of personal involvement and agency in the harm caused by unethical behavior is 
low. The concluding section builds on this analysis to propose ways in which 
unethical behavior in the finance industry can be contained through informed social 
action. 
 
Power and wealth in the finance industry 
The finance industry is marked by uniquely high levels of power and wealth 
(Bell & Van Reenen, 2013; Philippon & Reshef, 2012). At the level of the entire 
finance industry sector, wages are more than double of those in the rest of the 
economy in both the U.S. (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012) and the U.K. (Weale, 
2009). In 2007, the top 20 Wall Street fund managers earned an average of $658m, 
with some individuals’ compensation packages exceeding a billion dollars yearly 
(Ozanian & Schwartz, 2007). Even amidst the economic crisis, while wages in many 
sectors were dropping, wages in the finance industry rose even further (Williams, 
2013). This abundance promotes within-industry social norms and a mindset that sets 
the finance industry apart from the rest of the economy and often makes its culture 
 difficult to understand from the perspective of the public. In just one among many 
recent examples of the stark differences in the standards of personal outcomes 
expected from work between the finance industry and the rest of the society, the 
chairman of the Royal Bank of Scotland was criticized for describing its chief 
executive's compensation package as “modest;” it included £1.1m salary and £6m in 
bonuses yearly (Treanor, 2013). 
Research in sociology and social psychology suggests that social position can 
exert a profound influence on the thoughts, feelings, and behavior of the individual 
(Emerson, 1962; French & Raven, 1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Ng, 1980). Lord 
Acton famously warned that “Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely.” If power indeed leads to negative interpersonal consequences, as the 
popular belief suggests, then this effect might be an important explanation for the 
widespread unethical behavior in the finance industry, an industry marked by 
unprecedented power and wealth. Below I examine this potential explanation in 
detail. 
 
Psychological consequences of power  
The finance industry has been described as a high-power milieu, and financial 
professionals are often referred to as the “Masters of the Universe” (Das, 2011; 
McGee, 2011; Wolfe, 1987). The influence of the finance industry over other domains 
of business activity and everyday life provides its professionals with power unrivaled 
in the business world (Cohan, 2011).  
Psychological research shows that differences in one’s power profoundly 
affect individuals’ psychology and behavior, including interpersonal behavior. Power 
can be defined in this context  as an individual’s “capacity to modify others’ states by 
providing or withholding resources or administering punishment” (Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003, p. 265). The approach / inhibition theory of power 
suggests that because the powerful control others’ outcomes, and depend less on 
others for the attainment of their own goals, power elicits a mindset focused on 
rewards (Keltner et al., 2003). This, in turn, is hypothesized to make the powerful 
more concerned with their own interest and less attentive to others and others’ 
interests.  
Empirical research that examined how power affects different domains of 
interpersonal behavior generally found evidence consistent with this prediction. In an 
early empirical test, Kipnis (1972) gave a range of institutional powers to one group 
of participants ostensibly managing workers. Participants in the control group 
engaged in the same task, but were not told they had the same level of power. The 
study found that power made participants more willing to exert influence on the 
workers to accomplish the tasks and also made participants show less concern for the 
workers.  
Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, and Galinsky (2008) examined how power affects 
individuals’ tendency to objectify other people (consider them as a means to 
achieving their own objectives). The researchers manipulated power in different 
ways: For instance, participants were asked to think about a work relationship either 
 with a subordinate (thus eliciting a sense of power) or a coworker at the same 
hierarchical level (the control condition); another manipulation assigned some 
participants to be either the boss or the subordinate in a business simulation (thus 
manipulating power by varying their actual social position). Following such power 
manipulations, the researchers examined participants’ behavior toward individuals 
who were either consistent or inconsistent with the participant’s focal goal. The 
studies found that across a range of responses, from interpersonal liking to hiring and 
friendship preference, power made people more likely to favor people instrumental to 
their personal objectives. Thus, power increased the objectification of others. 
The apparent reduced concern for others on the part of the powerful is also 
argued to stem from the fact that due to their superior social position, the powerful are 
less dependent on others for their own outcomes. Some research focused specifically 
on whether power reduces the concern for others. Van Kleef et al. (2008) examined 
whether power reduced reciprocal emotional responses to another person’s suffering. 
Participants who reported a higher sense of power felt less distress and less 
compassion while hearing about an experience of suffering by another person. These 
responses were mediated by a lower affiliation motivation on the part of the powerful, 
supporting the interpretation that the powerful invest less in others because they are 
less dependent on others for their outcomes.  
Another research looked at the effect of power on perspective taking, or the 
tendency to assume the perspective of others and imagine their emotions, perceptions, 
and motivations (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006). The researchers 
expected that because the powerful are less dependent on others, a greater sense of 
power should reduce the tendency to take the perspective of others. Participants’ 
sense of power was manipulated by asking them to recall experiences in which they 
had power over another person versus incidents in which someone had power over 
them or neutral experiences. Results showed that the induced sense of power made 
participants exhibit less perspective taking, measured by examining different 
behaviors. For instance, in one study, participants were asked to write an “E” on their 
forehead so that another participant can read it. Power made participants more likely 
to draw an E on their forehead in a self-oriented direction (demonstrating less of an 
inclination to adopt another person’s visual perspective). In another study, 
participants were shown a series of pictures of people and were asked to decode the 
emotion that the person is feeling. Power led to lower accuracy in interpreting others’ 
emotion. Taken together, the results of the research on the effect of power on interest 
in and concern for others reveal an upsetting fact: Those who wield the most power 
are also those that seem to show the least concern about others. 
While this research strongly suggests that the unique concentration of power 
and influence in the finance industry might in itself prompt psychological tendencies 
that lead to more unethical decisions, some research also directly tested that 
explanation. Building on the work showing greater self-interest among the powerful 
and lower concern for others described above, Pitesa and Thau (2013b) examined the 
effect of power in the context of financial investment decisions made under moral 
hazard using others’ funds. In this situation, the decision maker is given an 
 opportunity to invest others’ funds in a risky project, but is insulated from any 
personal losses. The study context thus broadly resembles the moral hazard problem 
identified as one of the key reasons for unethical behavior in the finance industry 
(Dowd, 2009; Hellmann, Murdock, & Stiglitz, 2000). Moral hazard, as 
conceptualized in this research, refers to situations that occur whenever “incentive 
system that surrounds some set of transactions (and that may or many not be bound by 
a contract) involves an inducement (usually unintended) to one or more of the parties 
to act in an immoral manner” (Nowak & O’Sullivan, 2012, p. 149). 
A topical example of unethical behavior under moral hazard is the 2008 
subprime mortgage crisis. Previously, banks held mortgages to maturity, and therefore 
took a loss if the mortgage holder defaulted, which made them careful with respect to 
whom they lent to. However, when banks started selling mortgages on the secondary 
market (securitizing them), they no longer had to bear the consequences of defaults. 
This created moral hazard, as banks were in the position to take as much risk in terms 
of whom they lent to as they wanted and transfer the potential negative effects to the 
buyers in the secondary market. In 2006 alone, banks originated almost three million 
subprime loans, taking unfathomable risks in terms of the relative financial solidity of 
the borrowers, collecting record fees for originating the loans, and transferring most 
of the risk to investors in the secondary financial market. Several months later, the 
subprime mortgage crisis began, dragging the world into one of the worst financial 
crises in history. Research by Pitesa and Thau (2013b) found support for the notion 
that sense of power contributes to self-serving behavior when agents make financial 
investment decision using others’ funds under moral hazard. Power (either primed 
using a recall task manipulated by assigning participants to different roles) made 
participants invest greater amounts of others’ funds in risky investments, thus 
increasing potential gains for themselves, but exposing others to a greater risk of 
potential loss. 
Apart from causing a greater focus on personal rewards, and a lack of concern 
for others, power may also have implications for unethical behavior by affecting the 
expression of people’s personal dispositions. Those in power have more freedom to 
pursue their personal goals than do those lacking power, who are more constrained by 
their social environment (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). 
Building on this reasoning, it follows that power should increase the consistency 
between dispositions and behavior, even in the moral domain. As outlined below, 
research provides support for this prediction: Power liberates immoral individuals to 
pursue their self-interest at the expense of others’, but it also empowers moral 
individuals to follow their moral character and act more ethically. 
One way in which research conceptualizes temporally stable between-
individual differences in the importance of moral values is moral identity (Aquino & 
Reed, 2002; Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007). A person’s moral identity is 
understood as a complex knowledge structure comprised of moral values, goals, traits, 
and behavioral scripts (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 
2002). Lapsley and Lasky (2001) define a high moral identity person as someone “for 
whom moral schemas are chronically available, readily primed, and easily activated 
 for information processing” (p. 347). Consistent with the notion that power amplifies 
the expression of people’s dispositions, research by DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, and 
Ceranic (2012) found that although power caused people with low moral identity to 
act more unethically (e.g., taking more resources for the self at the expense of others 
in an experiment, and engaging in a range of deviant behaviors at work), power led 
high moral identity people to act more ethically. Similarly, Pitesa and Thau (2013a) 
found that power makes people more likely to disregard their social environment 
when making (un)ethical decisions and instead follow their internal dispositions. For 
instance, they found that people who are more Machiavellian (a personality construct 
emphasizing preferences for self-interested behavior at the expense of others) 
negotiate more unethically when primed with power. In contrast, those who are less 
Machiavellian (and therefore averse to self-interested behavior at the expense of 
others) negotiated more ethically when primed with power. Taken together, this 
stream of research shows that another mechanism by which power may affect 
propensity for (un)ethical conduct is by liberating people to pursue their internal 
dispositions, for better or worse. 
In conclusion, research shows that power, one of the hallmarks of the modern 
finance industry, has profound psychological effects on those who possess it. Most 
research demonstrates more self-interested behavior among the powerful, and thus 
gives scientific support to the colloquial notion that power corrupts. Power may thus 
be one of the explanations for the high levels of unethical behavior in the finance 
industry. However, research on the psychology of power also shows that for highly 
moral individuals, power does not corrupt (and may even lead to more moral 
behavior), suggesting a tremendous importance of selecting people with strong moral 
characters in the domain of finance, and indeed anywhere that power is entrusted. 
 
Psychological consequences of money 
More than any other domain of human activity, the finance industry is focused 
on money. Although today people take money and its role in the world of business for 
granted, research in anthropology (Fiske, 1992) and social psychology (Vohs, Mead, 
& Goode, 2008) shows that differences in the focus on money may be relevant for 
how people construe and engage in social interactions. 
At the most general level, money implies quantifying the value of real-world 
phenomena (Simmel, 1990 [1907]). Weber believed quantification to be the very 
essence of rationalized capitalistic economic activity (1992 [1930]). He noticed that 
quantification increasingly permeated modern life, leading to a “specifically modern 
calculating attitude” (Weber, 1978 [1956], p. 86). In the everyday life of business 
activity, quantification became an essential part of organizational social language 
used to legitimize organizational conduct (March, 1987). 
Although monetization and quantification produce tremendous benefits in 
terms of efficiency of conducting business, the focus on money may come at a price 
in terms of the quality of social interactions. Quantification, propelled by the growing 
importance of knowledge and technical expertise, may depersonalize social relations. 
Impersonality in social relations is a threat to ethical behavior, which depends on 
 empathy and humane, personal construal of social relationships (Gino, Shu, & 
Bazerman, 2009; Small & Loewenstein, 2003). Simmel (1990 [1907]), in his analysis 
of the role of money in modern life, proposes that quantification produces the 
uniquely “calculating character of modem times” shifting people’s attention towards 
“measuring, weighing, and calculating” (pp. 443–444), promoting intellectualization 
at the expense of emotional faculties. Thus, by reducing empathetic disposition and 
instead promoting deliberative and calculative mindset, the focus on money may have 
negative interpersonal consequences and may lead to an increased objectification of 
other people. 
Recent research provides empirical support for these arguments. In a series of 
experiments, Zhong (2011) asked people to calculate mathematical  problems (versus 
report their feelings about an issue) and has subsequently given participants an 
opportunity to deceive another participant in hope of winning more funds in an 
economic game. These studies found that the deliberative mindset elicited in the 
condition in which participants worked on the quantitative task increased the level of 
unethical behavior. The explanation for this effect is that the deliberative mindset 
promoted by the quantitative content allows people to override and suppress their 
emotional empathetic responses and instead follow their self-interest. This argument 
builds on the distinction between two psychological systems, one evolutionarily older 
and impulse-driven, and one evolutionarily recent and controlled (see, e.g., Evans, 
2008, for a review). Research in moral psychology (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Kesebir, 
2010) and primatology (de Waal, 1997, 2006) suggests that people have innate moral 
intuitions that motivate concern for others and in that way facilitate the functioning of 
social systems. The research by Zhong (2011) shows that controlled and deliberative 
thinking can be used to override these moral impulses, facilitating unethical behavior 
(see also Cornelissen, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2011). Thus, the focus on quantitative and 
monetary aspects of phenomena, uniquely present in the finance industry, may in 
itself promote a deliberative mindset at the expense of intuitive and empathetic 
responses, and in that way promote more unethical behavior. 
In addition to suppressing the emotional and empathetic impulses, the ubiquity 
of money may affect how people in the finance industry construe situations they 
encounter. The seemingly all-encompassing financialisation of a whole array of 
aspects of contemporary life has been treated in detail in other chapters of this volume 
(chapters x and y for example). One set of admonitions in relation to the widespread 
monetization and quantification of modern life, and organizational life in particular, 
concerns the fact that quantification directs people’s focus towards technical and 
instrumental aspects of a given situation and away from its interpersonal aspects, 
making non-technical content lose importance as a basis for judgment (Porter, 1995). 
In this sense, money is relevant as a contextual cue that people in organizations rely 
on to interpret what kind of situation they are facing (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 
1977). This is important for ethical decision making because if one does not assume 
ethical perspective when it is called for, or if one does so to a relatively lesser degree, 
one is less likely to be aware of the ethical relevance of the situation (Rest, 1986). 
This, in turn, means that ethically-relevant information will not be adequately 
 included in the subsequent decision making process (Gioia, 1992; Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).  
For instance, Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) show that the very presence of a 
sanctioning system (affecting the expectation of behavior requiring such a system) 
will make individuals more likely to construe situation as a competitive and business 
situation rather than consider its ethical aspects (see also Pillutla & Chen, 1999). Kay, 
Wheeler, Bargh, and Ross (2004) found that the mere placement of objects common 
to the domain of business (e.g., boardroom tables and briefcases) in a room where the 
experiment is conducted makes the construct of competition more salient and, in turn, 
leads to more selfish behavior in interpersonal interactions. In a similar manner, 
money, the defining element of the finance industry, due to its general association 
with amoral and technical domains (Fiske, 1992; Simmel, 1990 [1907]), may serve as 
a strong contextual cue making individuals less likely to assume an ethical 
perspective. Providing support for this reasoning, Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, and 
Sousa (2013) found in a series of experiments that activating the concept of money 
makes people more likely to adopt a business decision frame, in turn leading to more 
unethical behavior. 
Another way in which money and wealth that are uniquely represented in the 
finance industry might affect ethical decisions and behavior is through the more 
general role of money in the ability of individuals to satisfy their goals in life. The 
research by Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) advanced the hypothesis that money 
brings about a self-sufficient orientation, making people prefer to be free of 
dependency and dependents. This notion is broadly consistent with research on social 
class, which shows that, partly out of necessity, low-income people adopt a more 
interdependent self-construal and emphasize social relationships more than do those 
with more resources (Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007). The reasoning behind 
these perspectives emphasizes the fact that money facilitates the attainment of goals 
in life, so people who possess it are less dependent on others. This, in turn, should 
make them less interested in other people and their wellbeing, including in situations 
when others are harmed by unethical conduct (cf. Petersen, 2012).  
Research by Pitesa and Thau (2014) directly examined whether having (vs. 
lacking) material resources leads to higher (vs. lower) sense of personal vulnerability 
(i.e., the ability to cope with negative events in life) and, in turn, less harsh (harsher) 
judgments of others’ moral transgressions. In a large-scale field study, this research 
found that those with a low income make harsher moral judgments of a range of 
unethical behaviors. In addition, inflation (which diminishes the value of material 
resources people have at their disposal) also led to harsher moral judgments, and this 
effect was stronger among low-income people, whom inflation renders especially 
vulnerable in terms of their ability to cope with negative events in life. In a follow-up 
experiment, this research found that manipulating people’s sense of how much 
resources they have (using differential scale anchors in different experimental 
conditions) affects people’s self-reported vulnerability and judgments of moral 
transgressions. Specifically, those who were made to feel as if they have more (less) 
material resources at their disposal felt less (more) vulnerable, and, in turn, made less 
 harsh (harsher) moral judgments. Thus, the abundance and wealth that characterize 
the finance industry may make people working within this industry less aversive to 
unethical behavior more generally, which may constitute another explanation for the 
greater levels of unethical behavior in the finance industry. Lower moral standards 
resulting from an abundance of resources might translate into less moral actions 
(Ajzen, 1991). More generally, leniency toward unethical behavior within the finance 
industry makes such behavior less likely to be punished (Cushman, 2008) and thus 
more likely to spread. 
 
Competitiveness in the finance industry 
The disproportionate representation of widely valued outcomes such as power 
and wealth described in the preceding section makes the finance industry an attractive 
domain of work. The greater attractiveness of rewards in this industry, however, 
implies greater competition (Matthews, 1994). Indeed, as mentioned previously, many 
people working in the finance industry feel pressured to engage in unethical conduct 
by the competitive work situation in this industry (Labaton Sucharow, 2012). In this 
section, I review research exploring the mechanisms by which the high levels of 
competitiveness present in the finance industry may cause increased unethical 
behavior. 
 
Psychological consequences of competitive task structure 
A greater competition implies a greater difficulty of attaining one’s goals. 
When people anticipate a greater difficulty in attaining their goals, they can be 
expected to be more likely to resort to unconventional means to attempt to reach their 
goals, including unethical behavior. Hegarty and Sims (1978) provided early 
experimental evidence that competition makes people more likely to resort to 
unethical behavior to attain valued goals in the business context. Participants in their 
experiment were asked whether they would opt for the unethical tactic of kickback 
bribes in order to keep a business contracts. In addition, the business context was 
described as more or less competitive. Consistent with the idea that competitive task 
structure promotes unethical behavior, this study found that participants opt for more 
unethical business practices when the context was described as more rather than less 
competitive. 
In another study that demonstrates the potential negative implications of 
competitive task structures, Schweitzer, Ordonez, and Douma (2004) compared the 
level of unethical behavior (misreporting performance on a verbal task) among people 
trying to “do their best” versus those who were trying to reach a specific difficult 
goal. Specifically, in one condition, they were told “do your best to create as many 
words as you can;” in the other condition, they were instructed to try to create 9 
words, a goal that was described as “difficult, but realistic.” After receiving the 
different instructions, participants were asked to work on a word task that involved 
creating words from collections of letters. After the allotted time, participants were 
given dictionaries and were asked to check their own work and report their 
performance. This provided participants with an opportunity to cheat by misreporting 
 their performance on the task. Unbeknownst to participants, experimenters were able 
to compare participants’ real performance and self-reported performance, thus 
measuring the degree of cheating. As predicted, participants who were instructed to 
“do their best” cheated less than did those who were trying to reach a specific difficult 
goal. Taken together, these studies show that the high level of competitiveness in the 
finance industry might itself stimulate people to “cut corners” and opt for unethical 
means of reaching their goals. 
The competition for the attractive rewards in the finance industry might also 
be relevant for the level of unethical behavior in this domain due to its effect on 
people’s regulatory focus. Psychological research shows that when people pursue 
goals, they focus more heavily either on the promotion of positive outcomes or on the 
prevention of negative outcomes (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). The high 
level of competition in the finance industry, as well as the related attractiveness of 
rewards, should lead to a greater focus on positive outcomes, and, thus, a greater 
promotion focus. Gino and Margolis (2011) argued that an increased promotion focus 
may lead to more unethical behavior. These authors manipulated participants’ 
regulatory focus in experiments and have found that inducing a prevention focus leads 
to more cheating, measured using a similar performance overstatement paradigm to 
the one described above (Schweitzer et al., 2004). Gino and Margolis (2011) found 
that the increase in unethical behavior as a result of induced promotion focus is 
mediated by increased risk-seeking behavior: Those who were focused on promotion 
of positive outcomes were more willing to engage in social risks in order to attain the 
desired outcomes.  
One final way in which the competitive nature of work in the finance industry 
may directly stimulate unethical behavior is intergroup competition. Companies in the 
finance industry compete fiercely among themselves (Matthews, 1994). In many 
domains of finance, such as investment banking, companies’ success is determined by 
their relative performance in comparison with other companies in the industry (Stulz, 
2007). Firms that produce higher returns for their clients rapidly attract other 
companies’ clients and thrive. Classical research in social psychology shows that such 
intense intergroup competition over valued resources promotes a competitive mindset 
in which people become much more willing to cross ethical boundaries to help their 
group win competitions and defeat other groups (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & 
Sherif, 1961). In addition, the context of intergroup conflict may promote cohesion 
within groups in a way that may provide psychological safety for group members to 
engage in unethical behavior (Narayanan, Ronson, & Pillutla, 2006; Pearsall & Ellis, 
2010). In fact, in the context of intergroup competition, members might even engage 
in unethical behavior that benefits their group motivated by the goal to gain social 
approval from others in the group (Pillutla & Thau, 2009; Thau, Derfler-Rozin, 
Pitesa, Mitchell, & Pillutla, 2014). Thus, the intergroup nature of competition in the 
finance industry might activate the propensity for ruthless competition tactics, 
including unethical tactics, and as such it might constitute another factor explaining 
the increased levels of unethical conduct in this domain. 
 
 Psychological consequences of increased cognitive demands 
Another implication of the extreme competitiveness in the finance industry is 
the tremendous investment of time and energy needed for successful performance. 
Michel (2011) conducted a nine-year ethnographic study to investigate the demands 
of work in investment banks. This research found that work norms in this field 
include extreme investment of energy and time: “The bank erased distinctions 
between work and leisure by providing administrative support 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week, encouraging leisure at work, and providing free amenities, including 
childcare, valets, car service, and meals. Some of the banks’ embodied controls 
focused on managing employees’ energy and included providing free caffeine and 
meals during ‘energy slumps,’ hiring young people, focusing on energy as the main 
hiring criterion, and firing low performers because of their energy drain” (Michel, 
2011, p. 336). 
Although work demands at first glance seem unrelated to people’s propensity 
to engage in unethical behavior, recent research indicates that this may in fact be an 
important factor determining the likelihood of crossing ethical boundaries. Research 
in psychology demonstrated that exerting self-control in order to override automatic 
impulses consumes actual physical energy (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008). The 
total amount of the energy required to exert self-control seems to be limited, so 
exerting self-control decreases the total level of available self-regulatory resources 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). Building on this finding, Mead, 
Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, and Ariely (2009) argued that a depletion of self-
control would lead to more unethical behavior because people would become less 
able to override (control) their impulses to engage in self-serving behavior. To test 
this idea, the researchers differentially depleted participants’ self-control by providing 
them with a prior task that either requires or does not require self-control to perform. 
As predicted, participants who exerted more self-control on a prior task (and thus had 
less self-control available) were less able to restrain their selfish impulses: They 
cheated more and were more likely to make decisions that resulted in additional 
opportunity to benefit the self through unethical conduct.  
In a follow-up research, Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, and Ariely (2011) further 
examined the relationship between the availability of self-regulatory resources and 
unethical behavior and have found that another mechanism by which a lack of self-
regulatory resources promotes unethical behavior is through decreased moral 
awareness. Those who are depleted in terms of energy available for self-regulation 
fail to notice and attend to the moral content of situations they face. In addition, this 
research provided further evidence of the relationship between self-regulatory 
resources and unethical behavior by testing this idea through a different study design. 
Participants were first given an opportunity to cheat and were then given a Stroop 
(1935) task. The key element of the task consists of seeing color names printed in 
incongruent colors (e.g., “green” printed in red) and naming the color the word was 
printed in, while ignoring the meaning of the word. This requires people to override 
the default response, which is to attend to the meaning of the word, and as such can be 
used to measure the availability of self-regulatory resources (DeWall, Baumeister, & 
 Vohs, 2008). The research by Gino et al. (2011) found that those who refrained from 
cheating (compared to those who cheated) performed worse on the Stroop task 
following the opportunity to cheat, indicating that their self-regulatory resources were 
depleted by the act of refraining from cheating. Taken together, this research indicates 
that the tremendous drain of energy resources necessary for work in the finance 
industry might itself be a factor promoting unethical behavior because on average 
people working in this domain should have less self-regulatory resources available to 
control their selfish impulses (see also Thau & Mitchell, 2010, for other pathways 
through which a lack of self-regulatory resources might promote problematic work 
behaviors). 
Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, and Ghumman (2011) extended this reasoning to 
the effect of sleep on unethical behavior. The authors reasoned that less sleep, and/or 
a lower quality of sleep results in overall lower levels of energy, thus reducing the 
level of self-regulatory resources available to stymie selfish impulses. The authors 
tested this idea in a series of studies. In one study, management undergraduate 
students’ sleep quantity was negatively associated with the tendency to misreport 
performance (for which they could win a cash prize). In another study, employees’ 
self-reported amount of sleep predicted their supervisor’s rating of the employee’s 
unethical conduct in the workplace, and this relationship was mediated by employee 
cognitive fatigue. Finally, the authors also conducted an experience sampling study, 
whereby working adults completed two surveys daily over the course of five days. 
The results showed that respondents’ daily changes in sleep quantity explained the 
variation in their propensity for unethical behavior, and this relationship was again 
mediated by their cognitive fatigue. Considering the extreme work hours (and the 
associated lack of sleep) in the finance industry noted by Michel (2011), it is likely 
that one element promoting the tendency to engage in unethical behavior is a low 
level of self-regulatory resources among employees in this industry. 
A related line of research examined the effect of time pressure on the 
propensity to make ethical and unethical decisions. In an early study on the effect of 
time pressure on social conduct, Darley and Batson (1973) instructed students at 
Princeton Theological Seminary to go give a talk in another building. In one 
condition, participants were told they were late and should hurry. In the second 
condition, they were told they had just enough time. In the third condition, they were 
told they would arrive early. On their way to the other building, the students 
encountered a stranger slumped in a doorway. In reality, this was a confederate and 
the purpose of the experiment was to examine how many participants would stop and 
offer help. The study found that 63% of participants who had abundant time stopped 
to help, 45% of participants who had just enough time, and only 10% of those were 
running late. This result shows that time pressure as a situational influence can have a 
significant effect on the propensity for ethical behavior, even among seminary 
students, who are presumably more disposed to engage in such positive interpersonal 
actions as helping than is the average person. 
While the results of the study by Darley and Batson (1973) can be explained 
by the fact that participants faced competing goals, recent research extended the logic 
 of self control as a limited resource (described above) to argue that time constraints 
may reduce the ability to override selfish impulses, thus actually causing more 
unethical behavior. Because overriding selfish impulses requires an active application 
of self-regulatory resources, people who are in a hurry might not have the time to do 
so fully. Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer (2012) provided an experimental test of this 
idea. Participants in their experiments were asked to throw a die and report the 
outcome, with higher outcomes leading to the possibility of higher additional 
payment. They were instructed to do so either under time pressure, within a pre-
defined time limit, or were told to take as much time as they needed. The results 
indicated that participants facing time pressure over-reported their outcomes 
significantly more than did participant not facing any time constraints. The authors 
interpret this finding as supporting the idea that a lack of time reduced participants’ 
ability to override their selfish impulses and restrain the propensity for unethical 
conduct. Taken together, this line of research suggests another possible element 
contributing to the high level of unethical behavior in the finance industry: Due to 
exceptional work demands and time pressure in the finance industry (Michel, 2011), 
people working in this domain might have less cognitive resources needed to inhibit 
impulses motivating unethical conduct. 
 
Saliency of interpersonal impact in the finance industry 
Another characteristic of the finance industry is that it is defined by a 
relatively technical and impersonal type of work. As I elaborate below, people 
working in this domain often make decisions that do not seem to have implications 
for specific salient individuals and make their decisions in a relatively anonymous 
manner that does not create a sense of the ownership of the act. I refer to these 
situational features as the saliency of interpersonal impact, because they jointly define 
agents’ appreciation of the fact that they are committing acts that negatively affect 
others and are thus unethical. Research suggests that these situational features can 
affect the propensity for unethical behavior and may thus contribute to explaining 
unethical behavior in the finance industry. Below, I review how the nature of work in 
the finance industry affects the saliency of the victims of unethical behavior and the 
sense of personal agency, and how these two factors impact the tendency to engage in 
unethical conduct.  
 
Victim saliency 
For many decisions made in the finance industry, those who could ultimately 
be affected by the decision are not immediately salient. For example, when employees 
were making decisions on whether or not to issue subprime loans, ultimate victims of 
such behavior might not have been salient, as the immediate results of the act were 
benefits for all involved (those receiving as well as those issuing the loan). Similarly, 
when making decisions on whether or not to invest funds in risky assets, those that 
could be harmed by such behavior are not salient—in fact, the investor is very likely 
to never have met those on whose behalf the investment is made. Thus, one important 
feature of unethical behavior in the finance industry is that it can feel victimless, i.e., 
 the ultimate potential victim of such behavior is often not salient in the moment in 
which the decision is made. 
Research shows that the saliency of those affected by one’s decisions at work 
may be an important determinant of the propensity of engaging in unethical behavior. 
By saliency, I mean the vividness of the fact that the unethical behavior has negative 
consequences for another person (cf. Jones, 1991). The obedience studies conducted 
by Milgram (1965) offer an early empirical demonstration of the importance of this 
factor in explaining unethical behavior. In these experiments, participants were led to 
believe they participated in a study on the effects of punishment on learning. They 
were assigned, seemingly randomly, to the role of teacher. Another participant, in 
reality a confederate, was assigned to the role of learner. The learner was instructed to 
remember a series of word pairs, and teachers were asked to administer punishment 
(electroshocks) to the learner in case a word pair was remembered incorrectly. The 
real phenomenon of interest was participants’ compliance with the instruction to 
administer the ostensibly painful electroshocks to the learner; Milgram sought to 
understand when and why people could be made to engage in such unethical acts.  
One factor varied in these studies was how salient the victim was. In one 
condition, the subject could neither see nor hear the victim. In another condition, the 
victim could be heard but not seen. In yet another condition, the victim was placed in 
the same room with the participant and could thus be both seen and heard. In the final 
condition varying victim saliency, participants were asked to physically force the 
learner’s hand on a plate in order to administer shocks. As post-study questionnaires 
show, there were no differences in the attributed level of pain across conditions. Yet, 
there were significant differences in the propensity to administer electric shocks to the 
learner as a function of victim saliency, such that the level of obedience fell sharply 
the more salient the victim was made. Milgram (1965) proposed an interpretation of 
why low victim saliency leads to greater levels of harm inflicted on the victim: “the 
victim's suffering possesses an abstract, remote quality for the subject. He is aware, 
but only in a conceptual sense, that his actions cause pain to another person; the fact is 
apprehended, but not felt” (p. 63). Thus, it seems that even when it is clear that the 
unethical action has a negative effect on others, the lower saliency of the victim 
makes people experience and process this fact less intensely and makes them more 
likely to engage in unethical behavior.  
 A similar idea is present in research on the role of victim identifiability in 
helping. Schelling (1968) proposed that people evaluate the value of life differently 
when it is described using individuating information versus statistical information. 
Small and Loewenstein (2003) provided an empirical test of this notion and found that 
people are more willing to donate to identified victims than to statistical victims. This 
stream of research suggests that low victim identifiability hinders the ability to adopt 
the perspective of the victim, and thus empathize with the victim. For this reason, 
even when people know the consequences of their acts are identical, they intuitively 
feel more strongly and care about salient others. This, in turn, motivates greater level 
of other-regarding behavior for salient, compared to non-salient victims. 
 This reasoning has also been applied in research on ethical decision making. 
Watley and May (2004) used a scenario study to examine the effect of the amount of 
personal information about the potential victim of an unethical behavior on 
participants’ intentions to engage in this behavior. The authors found that including 
personal information reduced the intention to engage in unethical behavior and this 
effect was explained as arising due to the greater “moral intensity” of the situation 
when more personal information about the victim was present. Moral intensity here 
refers to the decision maker’s sense of moral relevance and gravity of the situation 
(Jones, 1991) and expresses the idea that in conditions in which those affected by 
unethical behavior are not salient, the agent of the unethical act is less likely to 
interpret and experience such behavior as problematic. Studies by Gino et al. (2009) 
similarly found in that making victims identifiable makes judgments of unethical 
actions against them harsher (indicating greater caring for the victims). 
The effect of low saliency of victims on the tendency to engage in unethical 
behavior may be particularly strong in combination with self-regulatory depletion, 
another problematic aspect in the finance industry noted previously. In a series of 
experiments, Pitesa, Thau, and Pillutla (2013) tested the idea that low awareness of 
the fact that one’s unethical behavior affects others makes it more likely for the 
impulsive response to engage in self-serving (rather than other-regarding) behavior, 
thus strengthening the negative effect of self-regulatory depletion on propensity for 
unethical conduct. This hypothesis was supported: Self-regulatory depletion led to 
significantly more unethical behavior among participants who were not reminded that 
their actions would affect others than among participants who were. Thus, the low 
saliency of those affected by unethical behavior in the finance industry may be 
particularly problematic in terms of its effects on unethical behavior in combination 
with the demanding nature of work in this domain. 
 
Personal agency 
Another characteristic of work in the finance industry that may be relevant for 
the prevalence of unethical behavior is the sense of personal agency in unethical 
actions people experience in this domain of work. Unethical behavior in the finance 
industry is often committed on a relatively large scale (e.g., the behavior that led to 
the subprime mortgage crisis) rather than as isolated incidents. This is relevant 
because acting as part of a broader social group can diminish the sense of personal 
agency in one’s actions (Zimbardo, 1969). In addition, those in the finance industry 
who commit unethical acts often work within larger organizations and institutional 
systems. This implies that many are actually not directly responsible for their own 
decisions but are conforming to the instructions of others (e.g., their superiors). 
Research in social psychology shows that in such situations people’s sense of their 
personal agency reduces dramatically (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; 
Milgram, 1965). Below I review research on unethical behavior that demonstrates that 
a lower sense of personal agency licenses people to engage in unethical behavior, thus 
demonstrating the importance of this feature of the work in the finance industry in 
explaining unethical behavior in this domain. 
 A study by Diener, Fraser, Beaman, and Kelem (1976) provides an early 
demonstration of the effect of a reduced sense of personal agency on unethical 
behavior. These authors conducted a naturalistic study on Halloween to examine 
conditions affecting children’s propensity to steal candy and money. The behavior of 
over 1,300 trick-or-treating children was unobtrusively observed. Raters recorded 
whether children were alone or in a group. In addition, personal responsibility was 
directly manipulated by either asking one or more children for their names (thus 
increasing the sense of personal agency), or leaving them anonymous. Children were 
instructed to take one candy each. The experimenter recorded how many candy 
children actually took and also whether they took some money, which they were not 
supposed to do. The study found that both acting as part of a group and being 
anonymous led to more unethical behavior. 
Zhong, Bohns, and Gino (2010) tested the idea that an illusory sense of 
anonymity caused by being in the dark promotes unethical behavior. In one study, 
participants were asked to solve a mathematical problem either in a well lit or a 
somewhat dim room and reward themselves financially based on their performance. 
This simple manipulation led to higher levels of unethical behavior (over-reporting 
their performance and thus taking more money than earned) in the dim room. In 
another study, the authors elicited the sense of darkness by merely asking participants 
to wear sunglasses while working on a task. The task consisted of distributing funds 
between themselves and another participant. Paralleling the results of the first study, 
wearing sunglasses led to more self-interested behavior (keeping more money for 
oneself), and this effect was mediated by participants’ self-reported perceived 
anonymity. Taken together, the research on anonymity of the agent shows that 
diminishing the sense of agency or responsibility for the unethical act disinhibits 
people to behave more unethically. 
Research also examined other factors that affect the sense of personal agency 
for unethical conduct. Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, and Bazerman (2012) argued that 
signing a document that affords the opportunity for unethical behavior (e.g., a tax 
report that can be filled out more or less honestly) at the beginning evokes a greater 
sense of personal agency for potential unethical conduct than does signing at the end. 
The reasoning for this prediction is that by signing at the beginning, the personal 
ownership of the actions that follow becomes temporarily salient. To the degree that 
people want to maintain a positive self-image of a moral person, this should decrease 
the likelihood of unethical behavior occurring. In contrast, singing at the end takes 
place after the unethical behavior may have already occurred, so it is less likely that it 
would affect the rate of unethical actions (e.g., by prompting people to revise their 
entries on a tax form). The researchers gave participants in an experiment an 
opportunity to misrepresent their performance for material gain and asked them to 
sign their name either before or after the opportunity for unethical behavior. As 
predicted, there was more unethical behavior in the condition in which participants 
signed at the end. In another study, the researchers partnered with an automobile 
insurance company and manipulated the form on which customers reported the 
odometer mileage of the cars insured by the company to request their signature either 
 at the beginning or at the end. As predicted, signing at the end was associated with 
more self-interested (mis)reporting of car mileage. 
Bryan, Adams, and Monin (2012) conducted a series of experiments in which 
participants were given an opportunity to earn money unethically. They manipulated 
participants’ sense of personal agency for unethical behavior by asking them either 
not to “cheat” or not to “be a cheater.” The latter wording implicates the self to a 
greater degree, creating a greater sense of personal agency in the unethical behavior. 
As predicted, the rates of unethical behavior were greater when participants were 
asked not to cheat than when they were asked not to be a cheater. These findings also 
indicate that the sense of personal agency can have a strong influence on the 
propensity for unethical behavior. As argued earlier, sense of personal agency in the 
finance industry can be relatively low, so this characteristic of work in finance may be 
an important additional explanation for the exceptional levels of unethical behavior in 
this domain. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter focused on three characteristics of the finance industry that might 
explain what most commentators have seen as the rampant unethical behavior in this 
domain of work however one may define “unethical”. I reviewed research explaining 
how the disproportionate representation of power and wealth affect how people 
working in finance approach social relationships, with important consequences for 
their propensity to behave unethically. Those in power are often more self-centered 
and more likely to disregard others’ interests. However, power can also have a 
liberating effect, and in combination with a strong moral character, does not have to 
be a corrupting force. Money, a hallmark of the finance industry, can promote 
unethical behavior by putting people in a more deliberative, rather than intuitive and 
empathetic, state of mind, and by shifting their focus away from social and ethical 
aspects of the situation and prompting an increased objectification of social 
relationships. Money may also make people feel self-sufficient and protected. This 
can reduce the general concern with unethical behavior among those in the finance 
industry. 
I also reviewed research showing that the competitive nature of work in the 
finance industry may be a driver of unethical behavior. Competition over rewards 
stimulates people to engage in unethical behavior to attain their goals, and this might 
be particularly relevant in the context of intergroup competition. In addition, the 
immense cognitive demands and time pressure can deplete people of self-regulatory 
resources needed to inhibit selfish impulses. Various elements of demanding working 
conditions in finance, from lack of sleep to intense schedules, may render those in this 
line of work more likely to succumb to selfish and unethical urges.  
Finally, I reviewed the literatures explaining how low victim saliency and 
personal agency in the finance industry may prompt and license unethical conduct. 
Because the ultimate victims of unethical behavior in the finance industry are often 
not salient, people committing these acts might not experience their actions 
sufficiently negatively to avoid behaving unethically. In addition, unethical actions in 
 the finance industry are often committed in such a way that does not create a strong 
sense of personal agency, for instance, because the unethical behavior occurs on a 
large scale or as part of broader organizational and institutional structures.  
While the primary goal of this analysis was to explain the increased level of 
unethical behavior in the finance industry through an analysis of its characteristic 
features, the conclusions drawn from this review may inform action aimed at 
regulating and managing unethical behavior in this domain. To quell the negative 
effects of power, decision makers may introduce accountability arrangements that 
divert decision makers’ focus to procedural (rather than outcome-oriented) aspects of 
their decisions, a method that has been shown to reduce self-serving tendencies 
among the powerful (Pitesa & Thau, 2013b; Rus, van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2012). 
Alleviating the potential problematic consequences of money might be more difficult, 
but one possible approach might be through corporate programs aimed at increasing 
the tendency to take others’ perspective and empathize with others. In addition, in 
view of the finding that power amplifies the expression of personal dispositions 
(DeCelles et al., 2012; Pitesa & Thau, 2013a), organizations should implement a 
stronger employee-selection policies based on evidence of (im)moral character of its 
employees. Some indication of person’s moral character may be gained through 
cleverly designed indirect assessment tools that minimize socially desirable 
responding, such as those based on implicit measures (see, e.g., Aquino & Reed, 
2002, Study 2). More importantly, organizations should be alert and more strongly 
responsive to explicit demonstrations of employees’ lack of moral character.  
The negative effects of competitive nature of work might be the most difficult 
to combat. At the very least, organizations might rethink the policy of extremely 
demanding working conditions and time pressure. There is perhaps more promise in 
reducing the negative aspects of low victim saliency and personal agency. 
Organizations could implement corporate programs, such as those based on corporate 
communication or training sessions that would direct employees’ attention to the 
potential negative impact their actions could have on others. In addition, organizations 
could enhance the sense of ownership of employees’ actions using various techniques 
that increase the sense of personal agency in the decisions people make at work, such 
as the previously described mechanism for implicating the self developed by Bryan et 
al. (2012). 
In conclusion, the finance industry is specific in comparison with other 
domains of work in several important ways that might explain the widespread 
unethical behavior in this industry. Considering the importance of finance for all 
aspect of business and life, understanding why unethical behavior occurs at an 
unacceptably high rate in this domain of work is of great social significance. This 
chapter has provided an overview of psychological processes underpinning unethical 
behavior in the finance industry and in so doing opens up avenues for further study of 
unethical behavior in this domain, as well as for informed action aimed at curbing 
such problematic conduct. 
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